Retro-Hugos in 2021

There has been quite a bit of controversy about the Retro-Hugos, as they award to authors and editors who are better-known now for their abuse of women, or their racism, or both (HP Lovecraft, and John W Campbell, both of whom have been removed from being celebrated in modern awards, both won an Retro-Hugo for 1945 this year).

There is also a problem that the same few names are nominated over and over again. In the 1945 Retro-Hugos, Astounding Science Fiction alone published three out of six Novellas, all six Novellettes and four out of six Short Stories – with the other five works all being published in other sf pulps (two each for Planet and Amazing, one for Thrilling Wonder). But there was a great deal of sf published outside the pulps, and much of it, being outside the influence of John W. Campbell, is more interesting and more suited to modern tastes. If we are to conduct Retro-Hugos, it seems to me that one benefit would be to bring to light works that are not well known among the sf reading public, usually because they were originally published in the “slicks” (general interest magazines, on better quality paper), or in non-sf literary journals.

I expect that if a wider public was made aware of these more varied sf works, the Retro-Hugo list would be both more diverse and more interesting, the awards would be more competitive and attract more interest (and so more nominators and more voters), and lots of people would gain the pleasure of reading interesting fiction from 75 years ago.

So.. I wrote up a suggestion for how to acheive that, and sent it through the contact form to Chicon 8 (the 2022 Worldcon, that will be administering the next, 1947 Retro-Hugos – 1946 was already issued in 1996 so the 2021 DC Worldcon will not be administering Retro-Hugos). My suggestion is below.

I don’t know whether you are intending to do Retro-Hugos for 1947 or not, but if you are, I have a suggestion.

Historically, the vast majority of works nominated have been works published in the sf pulp magazines of the time. There has been an occasional novel from outside that (Animal Farm and Sword in the Stone both won), but there was a much wider publication of sf fiction (short as well as novel-length) in the 1940s than just the canonical sf pulps, but sf published outside of the pulps is little known by most of fandom.

My suggestion is that you convene a panel of experts – historians of sf, critics, academics – to produce a list of eligible work; obviously, you’d include everything published in the pulps, but they would seek out work published in the slicks, in literary magazines, in other countries (especially the English-speaking UK, Australia, NZ and Canada). And they (or another team) could seek out availability, so that the list could provide a link so people could read the work. This would also make the production of a Retro-Hugo Packet much more straightforward, as most of the work would have been done in advance. If this was released well in advance of the nominations process – perhaps as early as the end of the 2021 Worldcon? – then it would give people opportunity to “read the year” and should encourage both a larger and a more diverse pool of nominators.

More controversially, the panel could choose to recommend a “longlist” (something like the Locus Recommended Reading List) of writing that is particularly good or notable, with particular attention to overlooked works that fit modern tastes. I can appreciate that the Worldcon itself might not want to officially approve such a list, but ensuring that it was created and widely publicised, especially to younger and more diverse readers, would have a really significant impact on the nominating and voting.

I believe that it is generally inappropriate to propose creating work for other people without volunteering to help. I’m not qualified to do the research part of identifying eligible work, and certainly not qualified to reduce it to a recommended longlist. But I’m quite prepared to join a team who will track down copyright holders, find what is in print and where it can be purchased from, identify out-of-copyright work, reformat such into ebook format and make it widely available (anyone can publish out-of-copyright ebooks for free in the Amazon Kindle webstore, for instance).

My twitter is broken.

Hoping this autoposts to twitter.

I have lost access to my twitter account.  Twitter support are helping me get back in but I need to do various verifications to prove it really is my account.

I should be back in about a week, in the meantime, please don’t DM me there!

Endorsing Jo Swinson for Leader of the Liberal Democrats

About 20 years ago, Jo Swinson was Vice-Chair of Liberal Democrat Youth and Students of England and Wales, and volunteered to take on the task of reviewing the constitution of that organisation, partly because it needed reviewing; partly in order to create a Scotland-shaped hole so that it could become an organisation across all of Great Britain.

She was not and is not, by the very high standards that the Lib Dems have for such, an expert in the details of constitutions. But she consulted a wide variety of people, she took opinions – some about very fine details – seriously enough to understand them and to come to an view of her own on those questions, and she developed an effective and flexible constitution that is the foundation of the structure used by the Young Liberals to this day.

As is clear from the problems with the Fixed-Term Parliament Act, or the relationship between the UK government and those of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, designing a constitutional change in detail and foreseeing the problems that might arise in ten or twenty – or fifty – years time is an important skill, and will especially be one for the Leader of a party that seeks extensive and profound constitutional change. I can think of very few people I would trust with the British constitution more than Jo. Certainly, I’d trust her more than myself – I’d get focused on my own opinions and not consult and listen as widely and as skilfully as she would.

That’s the piece of personal experience I have that convinced me that Jo was a politician of unusual and high talents. Nothing I have seen in the last 20 years has changed any part of that opinion, and everything I’ve seen has reinforced that view – and she has added skills and knowledge over the years, including five years as a minister.

So that’s why I’ll be voting for her for Leader of the Liberal Democrats. It might not be the case she would make for herself, but it’s the case that convinced me.

How to vote in Britain today

Today, 23 May 2019, is voting day in the United Kingdom.  It is officially called “polling day”.  Everyone in the UK over 18 who is a citizen of the UK, Ireland, the Commonwealth, or the European Union is entitled to vote, except for people actually in prison after being convicted for a crime, and people detained (“sectioned”) for mental illness.

If you want to vote – and you should – then you should have received a “polling card” from your local council. This will have arrived in the post about two or three weeks ago.  If you can find it, it will save you a couple of minutes when you go to vote, but if you can’t, don’t worry: you can still vote without it.

To vote, you have to go to your “polling station”, which is usually some sort of government building which is being used today so people can vote.  They are often schools, community centres, libraries, or government offices – sometimes they are other buildings rented for the purpose (e.g. a church or other religious building).  The polling station will close at 10pm, so you can vote until then.  The address of your polling station will be on the polling card (see, I said it would be useful), but if you don’t have it, then you can type in your postcode at a government website and it will give you the address to go to.

When you get there, there will be people inside, usually sitting at a table, who will ask for your card. If you don’t have it, then they will want your name and address.  If you’re in Northern Ireland, you need photo ID; in Great Britain, you don’t.  They then look you up on a list and cross you off so you can only vote once.  They’ll then give you your ballot paper.  You go into a private booth so no-one else can see who you voted for, do the vote (there are instructions on the ballot paper and a pencil to vote with), then you fold up the paper and put it in a ballot box.  This is a large black box with a slot in the top to slide your paper into.

If you are visually disabled, there is supposed to be a braille and a large-print template that you can put over the ballot paper so you can identify which box to put your vote in.  If neither of these are useful to you, then you can ask one of the staff to read out the ballot paper and then tell them who you want to vote for.  They are supposed to go into a separate room to do this so no-one can overhear. However, my experience is that the polling station staff are often unaware of these options, so you may have to be very insistent.  Also, finding the slot in the top of the ballot box is really hard without vision; I suggest asking a polling station staffer to help you.

If you are unexpectedly unable to get to the polling station (e.g. if you’re away for work, or if you or a friend or relative have to go to A&E or something), then you can get an emergency proxy vote until 5pm. This means that a friend or neighbour will vote for you.  You need to contact your election registration office by phone – click that link to find out where they are and what their number is – and explain why you need an emergency proxy, who you are going to get to vote for you, and they will help.

If you had expected to be unable to go to the polling station, then it is now too late, but you can contact your election registration office (please wait until Tuesday, though; they will be busy running the election today, busy counting the votes on Friday and Monday is a public holiday) and you can get a permanent postal vote (where your ballot paper is posted to you a week or two before polling day) or a permanent proxy vote (where someone else votes on your behalf).

On borders

I don’t like borders. They stop people from living where they want to live, they restrict people from buying what they want, but they are a fundamental part of how modern society works.

I’m going to ignore the question of the movement of services and capital, because the actual physical borders have very little to do with that.  Goods and people, though, borders have a lot to do with.

If you want to get rid of a physical border, you have to address five things.  I’ll take the UK-EU border as an example:

  1. Rights of citizens of the two countries to travel into each other’s countries.  This is what the EU calls “freedom of movement of labour”, and means that British citizens have the right to go to the EU , and vice versa.
  2. Common rules for admitting foreign citizens.  Under the Common Travel Area, anyone with a visa or the right to visa-free entry to Ireland is entitled to enter the UK from Ireland and vice versa.  Note that this means that all EU citizens will be entitled to enter the UK via the Irish border – this is true regardless of the terms of Brexit, because the Common Travel Area is established under the 1922 Anglo-Irish Treaty.  This is what Schengen deals with, and the fact the UK (and Ireland) isn’t in Schengen is why there are already passport checks for the Channel Tunnel and the ports where ships arrive in Britain from France/Belgium/Netherlands/Spain.  They’re not for EU citizens, but for non-Europeans who have visas to Schengen but not the UK. Post-Brexit, they could be for EU citizens too – the CTA only covers crossing the border between the UK and Ireland, which is different from Schengen (ie route of entry matters).

Not relevant to borders, but freedom of movement of labour also means the right to work and live permanently in the other country – rather than just the minimal right to travel as a tourist. But if you have the right to enter, then work permits and residence have to be resolved within the country, not at the border.

  1. The right of goods made in one country to cross into the other without tariffs or quotas being imposed. This is generally done through a free trade agreement, which is done through the EU – but could also be done through a bilateral between the UK and the EU.
  2. The right of goods imported into one country to be reexported into the other without tariffs or quotas.  This is fine if the country of origin of the imports has a free trade agreement with both, but if it doesn’t, then the tariff paid and the quota imposed have to be the same across both countries. That’s normally done by a customs union.  Without this, you have to have rules of origin (ie, if you import components from Japan into the UK and then assemble them into a car, how much work has to be done in the UK for it to be a British car and not a Japanese one when it’s sold into the EU?)
  3. Common regulations on goods, so anything that can be legally sold in one country can be legally sold in the other.  This is done in the EU by the common regulatory environment of the single market. This includes really important things like “phytosanitary” regulations (ie food safety).  Note that you don’t just have to have the same rules; each country has to accept that the other country’s regulators and inspectors are enforcing them adequately (this is an issue with, e.g., Kosovo, which adopts many EU regulations, but things have to be rechecked at the border because the EU doesn’t trust Kosovo’s regulators and inspectors).

The first two issues affect people crossing the border; the latter three affect goods. While people do cross borders with goods (their clothes, luggage, cars, etc), most countries allow goods to be brought across the border as long as there is no intent to resell or transfer the goods within the country, and have some de minimis rules so you can bring a birthday present for a family member without having to pay a tariff at the border.  In general, that means that if anyone who is legally in Ireland can legally travel to the UK, then people can cross the border without any need for checks – so a commuter can cross the border twice a day without needing to be checked.

But, just because people can cross the border, that doesn’t mean that you can drive a lorry-load of goods across.  And it’s this that is creating the concerns about traffic at the ports.  Even with a free-trade agreement, goods would have to be checked for regulatory compliance and for rules of origin compliance – e.g. something from the US would have to pay EU entry tariffs, even if it came via Britain, so every lorry would have to be checked to make sure the goods in it are British and not American.  These checks aren’t impossible to conduct – they happen at all of Switzerland’s external borders (with the EU) and at the Norway/Sweden border and are efficient and quick there. But that’s because there is plenty of infrastructure, ie lots of customs officers checking lorries and plenty of space so they can check many lorries at the same time (like a supermarket with lots of aisles).  We’d need to buy land at the ports and along the UK-Ireland border and hire lots of customs officers to enforce the rules. So would the other countries which have ports, and Ireland on their side of the land border.  No-one has done that. Buying land, concreting it over, building customs posts – this will take years to do, and countries haven’t even started.

 

Trans rights: beyond GRA reform

For a while, I, and other supporters of trans rights, have been trying to keep the debate about GRA reform to just the GRA reform. It is mostly opponents of trans rights who have been trying to widen the debate and pretend that GRA reform affects a bunch of other issues.  The GRA reform doesn’t affect these things, and we shouldn’t pretend that it does, nor should we delay or otherwise interfere with the GRA reform’s passage because of those issues.

That doesn’t mean we should ignore those issues. There are a lot of lies going around that are make at least some cis women afraid, and those lies need countering.  There are also some actual concerns.

Q: Will cis men be able to pretend to be trans women without actually transitioning and therefore demand access to women-only spaces?

A: I’m tempted to say something like “are you kidding?”, but let’s take the question seriously:

Firstly, most “women-only spaces” (like toilets and changing-rooms) are run on an honour system. There’s a sign, and you go into the one that you feel is most appropriate to you.  So it’s not like there is anything to stop a cis man going into the women’s toilets. Clearly, security staff and/or police could eventually remove them if they are causing trouble, but I don’t see how saying “I’m a woman” is going to make any difference to that.  If they’re not causing trouble, then, well, how much of a problem was there in the first place? After all, people (of both the most popular genders) have been going in the “wrong” toilet when there’s a big queue (e.g. at a concert or a sport event) at the other one for years.

Secondly, other “women-only spaces” (like rape and domestic violence shelters) have a person determining who is allowed in and who isn’t.  They already have to have rules for keeping some cis women out, because some of their residents have been abused by cis women, and also because male abusers sometimes recruit other women (sisters, mothers, new partners) to continue the harassment and abuse on their behalf.  Just being a woman doesn’t get you past an individual threat assessment.  Even if an abusive man went through a process to get female ID paperwork (and even the proposed GRA process is much more hassle than the current driving licence process – I can’t imagine someone that was deciding by paperwork accepting a birth certificate and rejecting a driving licence), that still wouldn’t get him in.

The same should apply to prisons – everyone sentenced for a crime should face an individual risk assessment to decide which prison to put them in, and the same any time they are transferred, including transferring from men’s to women’s prisons.  That should apply to every prisoner.  It seems that the prison service hasn’t been following their own policies (perhaps because of a lack of resources?) in a few cases recently, which have resulted in some genuinely awful situations, including trans women killing themselves in men’s prisons and sex offenders (it’s unclear from reports whether they were cis men lying about being trans or actual trans women) sexually assaulting women in women’s prisons. That’s not just true about trans people; there are serious problems with the prison service in the UK and they need addressing.  When the policy they have is followed and properly resourced, then it has worked; the Prison Service needs to start abiding by its own rules and needs adequate resources to be able to do so.

Q: Some trans women have either not yet completed physical transition, or choose not to have surgery. That means that they still have penises. That’s not really a problem in toilets, and what you’ve just described about the higher-security situations is reassuring, but what about communal changing rooms and showers?

A: I don’t know about women’s changing rooms beyond what women tell me, but you’d have to be really staring at people to spot a penis in men’s changing rooms. People don’t go flaunting their genitalia about.  Trans women, especially, are not generally very keen on their penises (that’s why so many of them eventually have their penis removed), so are especially unlikely to go waving them about.  Because genital surgery is just about the last step in the process of transition, there are always going to be a bunch of trans women around with penises – even if you only count people who are eventually going to have genital surgery as being properly trans (which, to be clear, I don’t) – but they will also often have otherwise feminine bodies. Since they clearly can’t use the men’s changing rooms and showers, the only options are that they can’t use facilities where they have to change, or that they use the women’s changing rooms.  Most places now have at least some private changing rooms (often described as “family rooms” because they’re intended to allow parents to change with their different-gender children) and perhaps cis women who would have an unusually strong reaction to a trans woman with a penis (for instance, as a result of past sexual abuse) should consider using those?

If you’re thinking about changing rooms in clothes shops, then they’re often not segregated in the first place. You’re in a individual cubicle, not in a shared space, so it doesn’t really matter who is in the next cubicle anyway.

You might see some transphobes pointing at a handful of cases where trans women have got photos showing their penises with them in various public places. What you may not spot, because they often take the photos out of context, is that these are almost always people who work in “adult entertainment” (ie, porn, stripping, or prostitution) and, well, cis women who work in those jobs also have lots of photos of themselves in public places with their primary genitalia exposed.  The fact that a porn actress will have a photo taken in a shared changing room of her genitalia really says nothing about the normal behaviour of women (cis or trans).

Q: OK, but trans is a much wider concept than binary trans women. What about non-binary people or trans people who are also intersex or other people who don’t fit neatly into the category of “women” or “men”?

A: This is why trans rights campaigners have been pushing desegregation where possible in the first place. If you aren’t either a woman or a man, and the choices are “women’s toilet” or “men’s toilet”, which one are you supposed to use?

I think the only plausible answer is “whichever one makes you feel less uncomfortable”. But the ideal answer is that we don’t have that sort of segregation any more. Reorganise facilities to offer enough privacy that they can be mixed whereever possible.  If that can’t be done, then I think it’s incumbent on binary cis people to be accepting of non-binary people using the facility they are most comfortable in.  And, obviously, non-binary people can’t go into strictly women-only spaces (like domestic violence shelters) because they aren’t women.  Of course, the GRA has nothing to do with non-binary people because we don’t allow legal documents to have a non-binary status. International passport rules allow for M F or X, but the UK won’t issue X passports and it should.

Part of the confusion here is that some transphobes refuse to refer to trans women as women and call them “trans” (often as a noun) – so, when trans allies and trans people say that “trans” is much wider than binary trans women, they think, or pretend that they think, that we’re saying that every trans person who was assigned male at birth is a trans woman. We aren’t saying that. Only the binary trans women are trans women. You can be trans and non-binary. All that means is that you were assigned either male or female at birth and you identify with a non-binary gender.  Estimates vary, but between two thirds and three quarters of trans people are non-binary, the vast majority of whom do not want to have genital surgery. This means that binary trans women are a small minority of trans people, but they form the vast majority of people seeking surgery (very few non-binary people seek surgery; binary trans men are much less likely to seek surgery than binary trans women, in part because the results of transition surgery for trans men are not generally as good as for trans women). This has been used by transphobes to pretend that most trans women do not want surgery.

Another confusion is that a lot of stories about transgender or about trans women are illustrated with photos of drag performers.  People then reasonably start asking questions like “which toilet should Conchita Wurst use?”. Conchita Wurst is a fictional character and doesn’t use real-world toilets at all. It’s like asking which toilet Hermione Granger uses.  Thomas Neuwirth uses the men’s; Emma Watson uses the women’s. Drag performers may, in some sense, be in a broad trans umbrella. But no-one claims that drag queens are women. They’re cis men playing female characters. They use female pronouns when they are in-character because they are the pronouns about their character, not because they are actually women.

Q: What about sport? Trans women have an advantage over cis women, don’t they?

A: Trans women who have been on hormone therapy for more than a year or two (the time period in the rules varies between sports) do not have an advantage over cis women.  Trans women have been allowed to compete in the Olympics for over a decade and have never won a medal – if this was a huge advantage, there would be lots of examples of trans women with Olympic medals.  A few trans women have succeeded in sport, at lower levels, but not out of proportion with the (small) numbers of trans women involved in sport.  The idea that trans women are going to dominate women’s sport is bunk – if that was going to happen, it already would have happened.

There is quite a long list of trans women who have won various competitions, which can easily look like trans women dominating sport to someone who doesn’t pay much attention to sport.  Just as an example of how many competitions there are in sport: In the UK, there is an annual event run by the BBC called “Sports Personality of the Year” which celebrates British sporting success. One segment of that is a montage of every British world champion individual or team from the year.  The segment is usually about ten minutes long and goes through hundreds of champions, about half of whom are women. That’s just British world champions.  There are an astonishingly large number of women who win sporting competitions in a year. A tiny fraction of them are trans.

At some junior levels of sport, trans women and (especially) trans girls are allowed to compete before they have completed the usual 1-2 years on hormone therapy. This is so that a teenager doesn’t have to give up sport entirely for a year or two when they transition (which is, for obvious reasons, more of an issue with teenagers than older sportspeople).  These trans girls do absolutely have an advantage if they went through male puberty (if they had puberty blockers before puberty, then they don’t) until the testosterone gets out of their system and their muscles reform in the changed hormonal environment.  At these levels, though, sport is not simply a competition; it’s also a case of encouraging people to exercise and participate – and excluding people from participation for years goes directly against the spirit of sporting participation.

Q: Speaking of puberty blockers, aren’t there problems with giving them to relatively young people (ie starting before puberty, that, presumably, being the point)?

A: Like all medication, they do have side-effects, but not using them means committing to irreversible changes to the body. If those changes will be distressing (because of gender dysphoria) for the rest of that child’s life, then the risks are pretty small in comparison.  There are a few medium-term (ie trying to be long-term, but they haven’t had enough time to complete) studies into health effects, which have not found significant effects with puberty blockers in general. There is currently a study (by the FDA in the US) into one specific blocker (lupron) which may have negative side effects – but that doesn’t affect the other dozen or so puberty blockers. Lupron is not the recommended first-line puberty blocker anyway; it’s getting on for 20 years since it was commonly used for trans-related health care.

Puberty blockers (which can be started around 10-12 years of age) are reversible. Children of that age do sometimes change their minds, which is why making an irreversible decision either to use hormone therapy, or to continue with an unblocked puberty is not recommended by medical best practice.

Q: Don’t trans women commit more crimes than cis women?

A: No. There is a Swedish study that shows that they did until 1989 but haven’t done so since. The assumption (there’s no way to be sure about what was going on that far back without having looked into it at the time, and no-one did) is that the problem was more that trans women were much poorer and faced much more discrimination before the late 1980s than they have since, and it’s well-known that people in poverty and people who are discriminated against commit more crimes than people who aren’t.  Incidentally, the study was on the period 1975-2003 and 1989 was just the halfway point through their study. There’s no particular reason to pick that year – but “somewhere between the mid-eighties and the mid-nineties” is what the evidence points to.

This was based on trans women who had entered into the official Swedish medical and legal transition system, so yes, it’s possible that trans women who haven’t started official legal and medical processes are more likely to commit crimes than ones that haven’t. If they are more likely to enter transition after going to prison than closeted trans women who are not imprisoned, that would mean that the numbers of trans women in prison would be somewhat elevated.  But there’s no way to know that, because there is no way to know how many closeted trans women there are, so you can’t measure the base rate.  But trans women who don’t enter the official systems won’t be able to get changed ID (for obvious reasons) so any changes to the process for getting ID clearly can’t make them more dangerous.

Importantly, the study was into all crime, not specifically violent crime. There is no evidence (either way) on violent crime or sex crime specifically.

Q: What about trans women working with children?  Especially in women-only jobs like Girl Guide (Girl Scout in the US) leaders?

A: Are trans women a greater threat to children than cis women? The basic safeguarding principle here is that some groups (e.g. people with criminal convictions) are a higher risk than the general population and therefore should be prevented from having positions of authority over children.  There are, of course, some cases of trans women abusing children. There are also cases of cis women abusing children. Unless there is some evidence of the numbers of trans women being statistically significantly higher than the numbers of cis women (hint: there isn’t), then there’s no reason to stop trans women from working with children. One case is not enough, unless you’d accept that one case of a cis woman abusing children is enough to ban all cis women from working with children.

As for women-only jobs, there clearly needs to be a rule in those jobs about at what point in transition a woman can apply for the job.

Q: What about trans men?

Trans men are often left out of this discussion. Trans men are, of course, men and therefore, when facilities are segregated, use the men’s facilities. Early transition trans men are at some risk from transphobic and/or misogynistic (cis) men when doing so. They choose their own timing to start using the men’s facilities, based on when they feel safe to do so.  This means that some early-transition trans men will be using women’s facilities.

Most transphobes concentrate on trans women, so there are many fewer claims going around about trans men that need debunking, which is why this is shorter than the long section about trans women.

But, just to be clear (especially because I’m a cis man writing this), trans men are men; where there are sex or gender segregated facilities, they should use the men’s facilities.

Q: So why are people making a fuss about this?

A: Because there are a lot of people who don’t want to acknowledge that a trans woman is an actual woman. There are a very few who will acknowledge some trans women and not others, and want to ensure that only the ones they regard as being transitioned enough are treated as women (exactly what they think the women are who are on the way but aren’t that transitioned yet is something they never specify), but the vast majority of the opposition comes from people who regard all trans women as being men (or, in some cases, a separate category of “transwomen who are male but not men”).  They know that saying what they believe in straightforward language is going to get them dismissed as transphobes, so they put out scare stories about men (by which they mean trans women, but they want you to think they mean cis men) “pretending” to be women and going into women’s toilets or changing rooms, etc.

Vote of no-confidence in Theresa May

I’ve noticed that there is some confusion around about a vote of no-confidence in Theresa May. The reason for this is that she has two jobs, both of which she can lose as a result of a vote of no-confidence, but different rules apply to those two.

Her two jobs are Leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and here are the rules:

Conservative Leader Prime Minister
Who can call a vote of no-confidence? 48 Conservative MPs (15% of all Conservative MPs), by writing to the Chairman of the 1922 Committee The Leader of the Opposition (ie Jeremy Corbyn) can call a motion at any time and it gets priority over other business in the House of Commons.

Other opposition parties can call one in their regularly-scheduled opposition day debates (there are 20 such a year, divided between the opposition parties).

The PM could call one on herself at any time as well.

Who gets to vote? Conservative MPs only, by secret ballot All MPs, voting through the lobbies in a recorded vote (ie we know who voted which way)
If Theresa May wins, how soon can another vote be called? 12 months The leader of the opposition can only call one again if the Speaker consents (this is supposed to be only if enough time has passed or there has been a significant change in the circumstances – exactly what that means is up to the Speaker).

Using a normal debate slot can be used freely – the official opposition controls most of the opposition day slots, so Corbyn could use one of those if the Speaker denies a second slot on the special priority procedure.

If Theresa May loses, how is her successor chosen? There has to be a Conservative leadership election. Candidates must be Conservative MPs, and require a proposer and seconder who are also Conservative MPs. There is then a series of votes (usually two days apart) by Conservative MPs. The candidate with the lowest vote is eliminated (X-Factor style), until there are only two candidates left. Then the last two are voted on by a postal ballot of all members of the Conservative Party. If someone else can win a motion of confidence in the next two weeks, then they become Prime Minister. If not, then there is a General Election and the new PM will be determined by who wins that.
At what point does Theresa May step down for her successor? Once there is a winner, they immediately replace May as Leader of the Conservatives. They would then be appointed as PM unless there has been a motion of no confidence in the PM. If a new PM is chosen, then she steps down immediately. If there is a General Election, then not until after the election – and if she wins the election, then she wouldn’t step down at all.

If she loses the election, then someone else becomes PM and she would almost certainly resign as Leader of the Conservatives and allow an election to replace her.

Hopefully this will help people to avoid the confusion between these two different votes of no confidence.

 

On military genius

There is a way of learning about warfare that many men (and a few women, but this is an overwhelmingly male approach) have from reading popular histories of warfare, from certain TV documentaries (especially from the era of the History Channel when it was nicknamed the “Hitler Channel”) and from lots of wargaming, both table-top in the seventies and eighties and computer since the mid-eighties. This is about almost ignoring the political/diplomatic context of wars and perceiving the economics as purely about the ability of national economies to supply the military machine. If your first thought about the US economy in WWII is about the mass manufacture of Sherman tanks and comparing that to the higher-quality tanks produced in lower numbers by the German economy, then this is the way of learning that you have.

This approach thinks mostly about battles in terms of the military skill displayed by the commanders on both sides.  As a grognard wargamer, I absolutely acknowledge this approach, but it isn’t history. It’s a form of art appreciation. The beauty of Hannibal’s double envelopment at Cannae, or of Rommel’s use of the desert to create encirclements in battle after battle in the North African campaign, or of Napoleon at Austerlitz, or of Grant at Vicksburg: does it really matter that these decisive victories were won with style, where Gettysburg, or El Alamein, or Friedland, or Zama, or were not?

But there is a real lesson, though: decisive victories – excepting those achieved by overwhelming numbers (e.g. the German defeats of Luxembourg in the two World Wars) nearly always come from the enemy commander making a bad mistake.

If you look at good generals, they create situations where there is an opportunity for the enemy to make a mistake, but where they themselves are not committed until the enemy does. If you want to see flashy maneuvring on both sides, then look at battles and campaigns where both generals were bad. Campaigns where both generals are good see them offering battle at an advantage and it being declined, until eventually the battle that is actually fought becomes a grinding battle of attritition and of the skill of lower-level officers and NCOs. Battles like Gettysburg or the Wilderness in the American Civil War, like El Alamein or Tunis in WWII, like Zama in the Second Punic War, like the battles of Alte Veste, Fürth and Lützen in the Thirty Years’ War – all of these involved skilful generals on both sides, and in none did an army get outmaneuvered. Victory came down to the quality and numbers on each side. These battles tend to be bloody even when there is a clear winner on one side or the other.

When I first started looking at history from this perspective, I was full of admiration for the so-called “military geniuses”. I can still name a few dozen. But, the more I looked at battles, the more it became clear that the big gaps in skill weren’t among the good generals, but the bad ones. Chancellorsville is more about how bad Hooker was than how good Lee was. The decisive battles of Sedan are about Napoleon III and Gamelin’s lacks of military skill, not about von Moltke or Manstein/Rundstedt/Guderian’s genius. Cannae is much more about Paullus and Varro than about Hannibal.

When people talk about an admiration for Robert E. Lee because of his military genius, I certainly understand that of which they speak – Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville are both fine works of the military art – but I no longer regard this as a high art where a handful of greats can exceed the merely good, in the way that a Mozart or a Beethoven can in music. I take the view that the few generals who look greater than other competent and skilful generals do so more because of the (lack of) qualities of their opponents. The result of this is that I’m much less inclined to honour great generalship for itself.

Also, of course, I’m interested in history and not just in the appreciation of the art of generalship. Saying that Erich von Manstein was a great general is like saying that Leni Riefenstahl was a great film director – it doesn’t in any way excuse the appalling nature of the cause for which he fought and she directed films. The same can and should be said for Lee and Jackson and Longstreet commanding the armies of the Confederacy.

A Brexit Plan

As I’m sure most people will know, I’m a Remainer and a pretty hardcore one – I’d like to join the Euro and Schengen, and I think that referendums are of pretty dubious legitimacy (and especially so for ill-defined binary choices used to claim democratic legitimacy for things that are being made up years after the votes were cast).

However, if I’m being forced to write a Brexit plan at gunpoint and I’m not allowed to write either “don’t do it” or “just stay in the EEA you fools”, then here goes:

  1. Slow down. Don’t trigger Article 50. If you already have (you fools), then negotiate for a long extension. If you can’t do that either, then EEA (on Norway’s terms and only very minor fiddling around the edges, because the 2 year time limit is very narrow and there isn’t time to negotiate much) as a transition with no defined end date, but rather a defined end state.
  2. By “defined end state”, I mean that the transition ends when we have an FTA with the rest of the EU and FTAs or other bilaterals/multilaterals with enough non-EU countries to feel comfortable (ie at least USA and China), and we have also agreed terms for an individual membership of the WTO. I’d expect that to take at least a decade and possibly two.
  3. Now we get to the difficult question.

Northern Ireland

Honestly, if I was advising the Tories, I’d say “Have a border poll and then get Boris Johnson to say a bunch of offensive things a week before polling day, and then it won’t be a problem.” but supposing we’re not allowed to just get rid of the place, the basic problem is that you can’t set up border patrols (because that’s a hard border and a breach of the Good Friday Agreement).

The current solution has been the CTA (a sort of mini-Schengen for the UK and Ireland), which will pretty much work fine for allowing people to physically cross the border at will (anyone with a visa from either the UK or Ireland is already allowed in the other country, so as long as EU citizens get visa-free travel to the UK as tourists then we don’t need border patrols) but there is then the problem of goods. If goods in a certain category can be imported into the UK  but not the EU (or vice versa) or would pay much more in tariffs in one or the other, then having no border controls at all would let people import through whichever is cheaper (or legal) and then load it on a lorry and drive over the border. If you can then go from NI to GB or from Ireland to the mainland EU by ferry, then Ireland could be used for a massive exercise in tariff evasion and even getting around legal restrictions if regulations vary between the UK and the EU after Brexit.

This is solvable for people, because short-term stays aren’t a big deal (and long-term stays have to be deal with in-country rather than at the border). But it’s harder for goods. Now, as long as the UK continues to have high regulatory standards (even if different from the EU) so it doesn’t become a massive loophole for dangerous goods (etc), then there might be an agreement to be made. For instance, suppose the UK agreed to require anything in the UK that isn’t allowed in the EU to be labelled as such (ie “Not for Sale in the EU”) and the tariffs are kept close enough that the extra costs of importing through the other country make tariff evasion rarely cost-effective in country (and you run the risk of getting caught – see tobacco smuggling within the EU as presently constituted) then it might be workable. That would be a tough and long negotiation. Remember, you could land a container at the new Liverpool2 port, load it on a lorry, drive to Birkenhead, cross to Belfast on a ferry, drive to Dublin and ferry to Cherbourg. So as long as that costs too much compared to just driving to Dover and paying the tariff, plus the risk of being caught for tariff evasion, then there might be a deal to be done between the UK and EU to allow there to be no customs at the Irish border.

You’d still have to do a deal on Ireland-Northern Ireland goods, but you could almost certainly make a deal where goods produced in either can be sold in the other without restriction. Both Ireland and NI would politically favour that in a big way.

But getting everyone to agree? You can see why I’m setting aside a decade!

Our European Future

This is a policy paper from a group I chaired, which became the policy of LDYS (Liberal Democrat Youth and Students, as they then were) at their Autumn Conference in 1997.  It’s not policy of anyone, and I no longer agree with all of it, but I’m putting it here so there is a copy available on-line; it was only available on paper hitherto.

Introduction and Remit

The LDYS EU working group has a remit limited to the consideration of the structures of a federal EU government and to the external aspects of foreign and security policy. We intend to present other papers dealing with other specific policy areas to future conferences. The general question of the division of powers between the European, national and regional levels is expressly excluded from the remit of this paper,
since it would in effect require a policy paper that covered everything – considering who should make a decision is difficult without thinking about the sort of decision they should make. Most decisions can already be taken at EU level, but the member-state veto tends to result in few actually being taken. In other words, it is the structure by which the EU takes decisions, rather than a lack of actual power to take them, that keeps so much decided by the member-states. We hope that future policy papers and motions will consider not only what LDYS policy should be, but where the power to take such decisions should reside – local, regional, national or European level.

Section One: Structures

The European Union’s structures are in desperate need of reform. The EU was established as an international agency, in the same manner as UN agencies such as UNESCO. This means that it operated by the consent of every member state and its decisions were implemented by the member states. Over the years it has evolved in to a body that is much more governmental in its nature. It has not changed its structures adequately to allow for the changing role of the organisation and for the expansion
from the original ECSC of Six to the current EU of Fifteen and probable future expansion to twenty or more. The most powerful body in the modern EU is the Council of Ministers; still the lineal descendant of the diplomatic conferences that established the EEC in the first place. Even in the days of Jacques Delors, the most powerful person within the EC was the head of government of a member state – Helmut Kohl. This structure is illiberal, unrepresentative and undemocratic.

The European Parliament over-represents the smaller member-states and underrepresents the larger ones. This – and the similar imbalance in the Council of Ministers when operating by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) derive from a compromise between equality between states and equality between citizens. This compromise is false.

LDYS propose the following reforms to the structures of the EU:

1. In the immediate future, LDYS will pursue the following:

  • Incorporation of the European Declaration of Human Rights into EU law.
  • Opening up the Council of Ministers to public scrutiny.
  • Equalisation of the membership in the European Parliament and a common electoral system of STV in multi-member constituencies.
  • Increasing the powers of the European Parliament and in particular increasing the usage of the co-decision procedure
  • Increasing the use of QMV in the council and lowering the threshold for a qualified majority from five-sixths to two-thirds.

In the longer term, we aim for a complete restructuring along the following lines:

2. To replace the Council of Ministers with a Senate: Each member state would have five representatives in the Senate, elected by the national parliament immediately after each general election on a basis of STV.

3. To adjust the membership of the European Parliament so that each MEP represents a million citizens. The smallest member state should still have one MEP. A common electoral system of STV in multi-member constituencies should be introduced. It would be elected for fixed four year terms. The European Parliament should decide for itself where its sittings should be.

4. The European Parliament would have the final decision on all legislation, although the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Council would be consulted.

Once passed, it would move to the Senate, which can accept, amend or reject. If the Senate amends or rejects a bill, it would return to the Parliament which can then pass it in whatever form it chooses without further reference to the Senate.

5. A new European executive should be established to replace the executive responsibilities of the Commission and the Council of Ministers. The administrative aspects of the Commission would continue as a civil service. It will be called the “European Cabinet” and will be directly elected by the European Parliament by a separate AV vote using a secret ballot for each position. If there is a vote of no
confidence in the Parliament, then there are new elections to the Cabinet. Members who resign would be replaced in the same manner. The European Parliament would decide number of cabinet ministers, the titles of the various ministers and their exact responsibilities and whether or not to have a “Prime Minister”.

6. All of these structures should be part of a federal constitution, which should also incorporate a “Declaration of the Rights of the European Citizen”. The European Court of Justice would be a court of final appeal in regard to both the constitution and European legislation. It will consist of one judge from each member-state, appointed by their national judiciaries. A President will be elected by the judges from amongst their own number. Cases will be heard by groups of five judges, sitting as the Court of First Instance. Several such Courts can hear cases at the same time. In cases regarding the
constitution where there has been a split verdict or where two judges who did not hear the case at first instance request it, there would be a right of appeal to a hearing of the full court.

7. The constitution can be amended by a two-thirds majority in a referendum called by the European Parliament.

Section Two: Foreign and Security Policy

The European Union does in theory have a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). At the moment, this means that the Foreign ministers have regular meetings to co-ordinate their policy; it has also involved the mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is some degree of co-operation between the diplomatic and particularly consular services of the member-states.

In the Security (that is, defence) arena, the major developments of recent years have been the work of Panavia on the Tornado and now the Eurofighter and the setting up of Eurocorps. This is a joint force consisting of contingents from several member states.

LDYS propose:

1. That the diplomatic and consular services of the EU member-states increase their co-operation. In particular, in some parts of the world it is proving very expensive for even the larger countries to have an embassy in every state. If embassies and consulates in some of the more distant parts of the world were merged into EU embassies and consulates, it would be possible to have full-time ambassadors in every country in the world (only the USA can do this at present). Also an EU consulate in some of the smaller or more remote cities would be far better than three member-state consulates in one and then none in the next city. Of course, member-states would retain independent embassies and consulates in the more important countries and cities (Washington, Moscow, Beijing, etc.)

2. That the EU be given full, rather than advisory membership of the UN and its agencies (UNCTAD, UNESCO, WHO, etc.), with an eventual aim of a permanent seat on the Security Council, replacing the UK and French seats.

3. An EU foreign policy should be a matter for the EU minister with responsibility for foreign relations, and the Foreign Ministers of the member-states will be responsible for their own policies.

4. There should be a single European agency for defence procurement, to ensure effective co-ordination and to reduce the political pressure for national preference. European militaries are bottom-heavy; they rely on the USA for top-level command, control and communications (C3). Also, the diversity in weapons systems is extremely wasteful; a European agency would resolve many of these problems.

5. The process of European integration was started in order to and will continue to seek to prevent and avoid war. European trading of arms with oppressive regimes should stop at once.

6. Nuclear weapons should remain exclusively a matter for the member states. LDYS restate their desire for an end to all nuclear weapons.